Given its close association with the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, it is tempting to assume that the response of Left intellectuals to the advent of atomic weapons was rooted in consistent opposition. This article demonstrates that the reality was much more complex. During the period of the US atomic monopoly (1945)(1946)(1947)(1948)(1949) British Left intellectuals wrestled with the implications of this new destructive force and arrived at widely different understandings and prognoses. However, many shared a pessimism rooted in the belief that the atomic monopoly could not be maintained for long, that beyond this point the atomic future was unmanageable, and that it would result in future war and annihilation. Drawing on a range of British left-wing responses, and focusing in particular on those of Bertrand Russell and George Orwell, this article emphasizes the shifting nature and complexity of Left responses to the advent of the US atomic monopoly and analyses the circumstances in which these were arrived at. It shows that it is inaccurate to think in terms of a single or coherent left-wing position on atomic weapons at a time when many on the left believed further war to be inevitable and some believed that the only way to prevent it might lie in launching, or threatening, a preventive atomic attack on the Soviet Union.
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Introduction
How did left-wing intellectuals in Britain respond to the advent of the atomic age?
What did they understand its implications to be? Given its close association with the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, it is tempting to assume that the response of Left intellectuals was rooted in consistent opposition. This article demonstrates that the reality was much more complex. During the period of the US atomic monopoly (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) , British Left intellectuals arrived at widely differing understandings and prognoses in the course of wrestling with the implications of this new destructive force. However, one common theme was pessimism rooted in the belief that the atomic monopoly could not be maintained for long, that beyond this point the atomic future was unmanageable and that it would result in atomic war. This article emphasizes the shifting nature of Left responses to the advent of the US atomic monopoly and focuses in particular on the responses of Bertrand Russell and George
Orwell to illustrate the complexities involved in the British Left intelligentsia's consideration of the implications of the atomic age in this formative period. It demonstrates that it is inaccurate to think in terms of a single, or even coherent, leftwing position on atomic weapons at a time when many on the left believed further war to be inevitable and some believed that the only way to prevent it might lie in launching, or threatening to launch, a preventive atomic attack on the Soviet Union.
The Gift of Destruction
In the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the implications of a world with atomic bombs were widely debated by the British Left intelligentsia. The leftwing Labour weekly, Tribune, talked of a 'Race with Catastrophe' the day after the Nagasaki bomb. 1 Only a week later, however, Tribune revised this judgment, talking instead of a 'shadow over the peace', owing to the redundancy of the old security measures and old strategic dispositions 'all over the world'. 2 The new weapon conferred an 'almost unimaginable superiority of power' on its present ownersassumed to be both the United States and Britain -'over all other nations including the Soviet Union'. The Communist Daily Worker detected 'considerable public concern' about this monopoly. 3 Tribune noted that those who thought another world war was inevitable 'rejoice in the Anglo-American monopoly', but added that the monopoly would prove short-lived, because it would only be 'a very short period of time' before the Soviet Union caught up. Rather than risk an arms race it would be better to share atomic knowledge and put the bomb under international control, as many on the left were demanding. 4 When President Truman announced in the autumn of 1945 that the USA would keep the secret of the new technology, the New Statesman and Nation acknowledged that the statement 'was not unexpected'; it was, however, regrettable. The secret could be preserved 'at most only for a very few years' and if Truman expected that the bomb would help him in the game of power politics, the temptation to exploit this leverage would be all the greater in view of the monopoly's expected brevity. But it was already clear to the New Statesman that the psychology of inferiority and fear so evident in the behaviour of the Russians at the Council of Ministers' meetings was related to this monopoly. Once the monopoly was broken 'the competition may bring us in sight of a war of extermination. The
American Century is not opening happily'. 'extraordinary' lack of public discussion about Britain's development of atomic weapons during the Attlee period noted by Kenneth Morgan. 7 But there is also little evidence of discussion of the bomb which already existed at the annual conferences of the Labour Party and Trades Union Congress before the Soviet Union acquired it. 8 Even Denis Healey, who remembered being 'obsessed with the moral, political and military implications of nuclear weapons' very soon after the end of the war, did not write on the subject until the 1950s. 9 Much of the public may have taken the view, as where would the international organisation be based; how could it be protected; how would an army of inspectors exercise effective vigilance over the whole globe, bearing in mind the probabilities of dispersed production, clandestine bargaining between governments, underground installations, and the ability to quickly assemble plant once the inspectors had left the scene of operations? And if all these objections
were met, what was there to prevent the special international organisation from becoming a tyrannous Leviathan or a site of Great Power struggles that would eventually shrink its stature in the same way the League of Nations was shrunk before it?
Woodward reflected the general pessimism among Left intellectuals in concluding that there was 'no hope of safety' in any of these clear-cut plans. There could be no fool-proof safety device against catastrophic destruction. For Woodward, only an approximation to security was possible. The sum of human misery seemed destined to increase, though commentators detected a certain short-term numbing of the popular mind in the autumn of 1945, attributable to war-weariness and incomprehension of the awesome power of the new weapons. Despite these emphases some socialists stressed that atomic technology was neither good nor bad in itself, but depended on how it was used by societies. Bernal did not fail to observe that the development of the bomb was the perfect illustration of an argument which he had honed since the 1920s. 29 Great strides in human progress depended on a planned scientific effort that was preferably trans-national, even global, in scope and involved much greater expenditures of resources than science was accustomed to receive under capitalism. In other words, progress depended on socialism. The expenditure of £500 million on the Manhattan Project was probably greater than the amount spent on scientific discovery since the beginning of time, he told the Fabian Society in January 1946. 30 The whole enterprise took only two years to complete and showed what could be achieved when market forces were suspended. But Bernal also told his Fabian audience -now just four months since Hiroshima -that the atomic bomb was 'the last word in terror weapons' -effective against cities and civilizations, but not a decisive military tool in its own right. Destroying German cities did not win the war in Europe and destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not win the war against Japan; 'the Japanese were beaten before the atom bombs fell', Bernal asserted, echoing the view laid down by the Kremlin. 31 What mattered now was the American folly of trying to maintain an atomic monopoly under conditions of secrecy inimical to science, progress and peace:
The one party concerned may think that he represents goodness and impartial authority and everybody else represents crime, but I think you will recognise that even if that were true it would still be a dangerous policy…the arbitrary use of a weapon in the hands of one party is a standing invitation for its use by other parties under the most undesirable conditions of rivalry and secrecy. already in dispute about access to atomic secrets and, concerned that the Russians were being depicted as the next enemy, he declared himself even more determined to help them. Lavrenti Beria received a consolidated report based on these clandestine sources in October 1945. 36 In December McMahon's Bill began its journey through
Congress, leading to a unique prohibition on free speech in America -a complete ban on the dissemination of technical data related to atomic energy.
As the Soviet Union emerged as a sinister contender for world domination, the US was not interested in diplomacy and had to be confronted on a global scale.
In this context the Acheson-Lilienthal Report fell still-born from the press. Truman turned to Bernard Baruch, a presidential adviser in both world wars, who produced an alternative plan in June 1946 proposing managerial control of all dangerous atomic energy activities and the dismantling of existing stockpiles of atomic weapons when an effective way had been found to police them internationally. Stalin was required to renounce any attempt to acquire his own bomb and defer to an international authority with real powers of inspection and punishment. In the meantime the Americans would keep their atomic monopoly. The Russians rejected the Baruch Plan by countering it with a proposal that states police themselves as they already did in respect of chemical weapons.
Russell and the Defence of Civilization
Bertrand Russell was one of the prominent left-wing supporters of the Baruch Plan in
Britain. The defence of civilization was a standpoint he had taken in the past -it informed his opposition to the Great War -and one he adopted now in the context of the American atomic monopoly. Russell had a deserved reputation as an opponent of war. This had been his stance in 1914-18, and at personal cost. It took until 1940 before he came to the conclusion that Hitler could only be stopped by force, so convinced had he been that force, or threats of force, would only encourage the fears which had promoted Hitler in the first place and bring a catastrophic war nearer.
Russell, then, was no war-monger. But he had been remarkably clear-eyed about the Bolshevik dictatorship since his visit to Soviet Russia in 1920 and never diverted from the views he expressed about it then -namely that it was a cruel and violent dictatorship. 38 During the Second World War he expressed regret that Stalin's dictatorship might survive it, declaring that it was even worse than Hitler's. Less than a month after the dropping of the bombs on Japan, he privately wrote:
I see very little hope for the world. There is no point in agreements not to use the atomic bomb, as they would not be kept. Russia is sure to learn how to make it. I think Stalin has inherited Hitler's ambition for world dictatorship. One must expect a war between USA and USSR, which will begin with the total destruction of London. I think the war will last 30 years, and leave a world without civilized people, from which everything will have to be built afresh -a process taking (say) 500 years. 39 As his biographer remarks, 'the apocalyptic vision of civilisation destroying itself through the power of its science and technology, which Russell had expressed in countless articles and books since the 1920s, now looked prophetic'. 40 Blackett in 1948, the year he won the Nobel Prize for physics, argued that the very decision to use atomic weapons against Japan had been taken for political reasons, rather than military, to secure a favourable balance of power for the USA against the Soviet Union; 'it was a clever and highly successful move in the field of power politics…the first act of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress'. 56 Likewise the Baruch Plan, Soviet compliance with which had so exercised Russell, was simply a 'victory for American diplomacy' rather than a serious attempt to solve the problem of atomic weapons. The Russians had been offered little more than subservience cleverly packaged as a wise and generous measure. Today most of the small nations are unable to produce modern weapons, even in small quantities. High-speed aeroplanes, or large-calibre guns, or pieces of armour plate big enough for battleships, can only be produced in the main industrial areas, of which there are about a dozen in the whole world. It follows that every small nation has to live under the protection, and to some extent under the control, of some big nation, usually its nearest neighbour. 58 Foreseeing the emergence of the bi-polar division of the global map, Orwell went on:
'The world will split into three camps, and ultimately into two, for Britain, not strong enough to stand alone, will become part of the American system. The smaller nations will be grouped about the bigger ones.' 59 Russell had reached similar conclusions about Britain's looming dependency on the US in the 1920s, though his emphasis then had been economic and ideological.
Orwell next mentioned the atomic bomb in a coda to his regular 'London Letter' for the US Partisan Review journal, penning two final paragraphs after news of Japan's surrender had reached Britain:
The news of the Japanese surrender came in yesterday about lunchtime, when I was in Fleet Street. There was quite a bit of jubilation in the streets, and people in upstairs offices instantly began tearing up old papers and throwing them out of the window…The prompt surrender of Japan seems to have altered people's outlook on the atomic bomb. At the beginning everyone I spoke to about it, or overheard in the street, was simply horrified. Now they begin to feel that there's something to be said for a weapon that could end the war in two days. Much speculation as to "whether the Russians have got it too." Also, from some quarters, demands that Anglo-America should hand over the secret of the bomb to Russia, which does seem to be carrying trustfulness a bit far. weapon by which millions of people can be wiped out in a few seconds, dividing the world between them. It has been rather hastily assumed that this means bigger and bloodier wars, and perhaps an actual end to the machine civilisation. But suppose -and really this is the likeliest development -that the surviving great nations make a tacit agreement never to use the atomic bomb against one another? Suppose they only use it, or the threat of it, against people who are unable to retaliate? In that case we are back where we were before, the only difference being that power is concentrated in still fewer hands and that the outlook for subject peoples and oppressed classes is still more hopeless. Orwell's revulsion at the potential destructive power of atomic weapons was highlighted in a subsequent Tribune piece, 'What is Science?', in which he contrasted favourably the refusal of some American and British physicists to contribute or continue with the Manhattan Project, with the continued co-operation of those who worked on it. These were, he told Tribune readers, 'sane men in the middle of a world of lunatics.' 65 His distaste for certain men of science -'power-hungry' scientific materialists like Bernal among them -would surface again. 66 Still, by year's end
Orwell appeared confident that the US could guard the secret of the bomb. Even by this time there is a sense that, for Orwell, the threat posed by the bomb would only become a factor once the Soviet Union acquired it. In addition, he predicted that in, 'all countries the general public will gradually lose interest in the subject.' 67 This was worrying because the understandable popular desire to return to normality was mixed up with a certain fatalism:
The notion that a war between Russia and America is inevitable within the next few decades, and that Britain, in its unfavourable geographical position, is bound to be blown to pieces by atomic bombs, is accepted with a sort of vague resignation, rather as people accept the statement that sooner or later the sun will cool down and we shall all freeze to death. The general public seems to have forgotten about the atomic bomb, which seldom figures in the news.
Everyone is intent on having a good time, so far as our reduced circumstances permit. Communism swallows the whole of Eurasia. The actual continuity of civilisation, he says, is threatened by the existence of atomic weapons, and there is no safeguard except to make sure that only one nation possesses them.' 70 Orwell could see a certain logic in this, even while making clear it was not his preferred option. Burnham, he wrote:
is certain to be denounced as a warmonger for writing this book. Yet if the danger is as acute as he believes, the course he suggests would probably be the right one: and more than this, he avoids the usual hypocritical attitude of "condemning" Russian policy while denying that it could be right in any circumstances to go to war. In international politics, as he realizes, you must either be ready to practice appeasement indefinitely, or at some point you must be ready to fight. 71 This raises the question of whether Orwell himself believed the danger to be as acute This is a reminder that the fear of the Soviet Union expressed in many public utterances by leading politicians was felt also on the Left, even by men as suspicious and sceptical of the political mood of the moment as Russell had always been.
But we are also reminded that in the brief period of the American monopoly a range of views coexisted on the meaning of atomic weapons within the British Left. There was a belief that they had shortened the war and saved lives, as well as dread that they had come into existence and profound pessimism as to their future control. Some asserted that they had rendered the old military technologies and thinking redundant, while others denied that they made a decisive difference to these questions. Winston 91 And yet by the journal's own reasoning this was untrue. The Western Powers had rejected calls for the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons until a foolproof system of international control, inspection and enforcement could be devised. The Russians, for their part, were 'not likely ever to agree to such a system of international inspection and sanctions' because their 'tightly regimented social and political system' had to be protected 'from any dangerous contact with the uncontrollable outside world. No country which has so much to hide as Russia and whose propagandist claims…are so grossly at variance with the facts can agree to an international control system which would inevitably become a medium of exposure'. All this pointed to an arms race. The New Statesman acknowledged the demise of the preventive war doctrine, adding that preparedness for war now meant that the state 'must be permanently and totally organised for war', much as Orwell depicted the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four. This would be prohibitively expensive 'unless Mr Truman and Mr. Stalin are prepared to transform their countries'. The socialist journal thought this to be unlikely because even the men in the Kremlin would not want to ruthlessly subordinate consumption to the needs of national defence for ever. 92 The incentives for disarmament and international controls as demanded by Dean Acheson at the UN were stronger than ever, it concluded. And yet it was only a matter of months before Truman announced his intention to develop hydrogen bombs. Soon winnable wars using nuclear weapons were credible again for public intellectuals -some of them notable men of the Left.
